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Short-Circuiting the New Major 
Questions Doctrine 
Kent Barnett* 
Christopher J. Walker** 
In Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis 
advance perhaps the most provocative proposal to date to address the new major 
questions doctrine articulated in King v. Burwell. They argue that the Supreme 
Court alone should identify “major questions” that deprive agencies of 
interpretive primacy, prohibiting the doctrine’s use in the lower courts. 
Although we agree that the Court provided little guidance about the doctrine’s 
scope in King v. Burwell, we are unpersuaded that the solution to this lack of 
guidance is to limit its doctrinal development to one court that hears fewer than 
eighty cases per year. On the contrary, our recent empirical study of every 
published circuit court decision that implicates Chevron deference over an 
eleven-year period suggests that the circuit courts have much value to add to the 
doctrine’s development and that they are unlikely to engage in the sort of 
widespread mischief that seems to motivate the Coenen and Davis proposal. 
Especially for a doctrine in its infancy that goes to the heart of Chevron’s 
theoretical foundations, short-circuiting the development of the new major 
questions doctrine in the lower courts only exacerbates its problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, 
crafted a new major questions doctrine that narrowed the scope of 
Chevron deference. Under the canonical Chevron doctrine, courts defer 
to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory 
provisions that they administer.1 Courts do so because Congress has 
expressly or implicitly delegated interpretive primacy to agencies, not 
courts, under these circumstances.2 In King v. Burwell, the Court held 
that the agency correctly interpreted an ambiguous statutory provision 
of the Affordable Care Act concerning subsidies for certain health-
insurance exchanges.3 Nevertheless, the Court reviewed the 
interpretation de novo, refusing to apply Chevron’s framework. That 
was because, the Court concluded, Chevron does not apply to questions 
of “deep ‘economic and political significance,’ ”4 especially when the 
agency—here the IRS—had “no expertise in crafting health insurance 
policy of this sort.”5  
In just two years since the Court decided King v. Burwell, 
scholars have spilt much ink debating the scope and propriety of this 
new major questions doctrine. One of us, for instance, has questioned 
whether King v. Burwell is just about major questions or, instead, part 
of the Chief Justice’s larger agenda to narrow Chevron to be a more 
context-specific inquiry.6 The scholarly debate, as detailed in Part I.B, 
has been particularly vexing because the Court in King v. Burwell 
provided little guidance on how to apply this new major questions 
doctrine in subsequent cases.  
In Minor Courts, Major Questions, Professors Michael Coenen 
and Seth Davis add to the debate by advancing perhaps the most 
provocative proposal to date. To limit the doctrinal disruption, they 
propose that the Supreme Court alone should identify “major questions” 
 
 1. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 842–43 (1984). 
 2. See id. at 843. 
 3. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487, 2491, 2494 (2015). 
 4. Id. (quoting Utility Air Reg. Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). 
 5. Id. (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266–67 (2006)). 
 6. Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 
1095, 1098–1105 (2017). 
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that deprive agencies of interpretive primacy.7 Prohibiting the lower 
courts from applying the major questions doctrine, they argue, would 
limit decisional and error costs inherent in lower-court decision-making 
without undermining the doctrine’s putative benefits.8 They concede 
that some benefits of “percolation” within the lower courts (that is, 
development of the doctrine as lower courts decide whether and how to 
apply it in various kinds of cases) would be lost. But they contend that 
de novo review can be useful to the Supreme Court even if the Court 
applies Chevron’s framework and that lower-court judges can signal 
views to the Court through dicta or separate opinions.9  
In this Response, we approach their proposal from the 
perspective of having recently spent three years reviewing every 
published circuit court decision that cites Chevron—over two thousand 
opinions—from 2003 through 2013.10 We agree that Chevron’s domain 
is inchoate and that the Supreme Court did not provide clear guidance 
to lower courts on how to apply the new major questions doctrine. But 
these key failings do not convince us to abandon traditional doctrinal 
development. Instead, they convince us that the federal judiciary has a 
lot more work to do in explicating the new major questions doctrine and 
its place under Chevron’s delegation theory. The Supreme Court’s 
dereliction of its duty on numerous Chevron-related questions is no 
reason for the lower courts to do the same. 
I. THE NEW MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE AND ITS CRITICS  
Before turning to our substantive response to the Coenen and 
Davis proposal in Part II, we first document the origins of the new major 
questions doctrine in King v. Burwell (Part I.A) and then situate the 
Coenen and Davis proposal within the larger scholarly debate on the 
new major questions doctrine (Part I.B). 
A. Tracing the Doctrine’s Origins 
As Coenen and Davis chronicle, the major questions doctrine has 
become a doctrine for all Chevron-related occasions. The Court initially 
applied the doctrine at Chevron’s first of two steps. By considering 
whether Congress would have intended to give agencies authority over 
 
 7. See Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777 
(2017). 
 8. See id. at 800, 812–20. 
 9. See id. at 821–22. 
 10. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808848. 
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questions of “economic and political significance,” the doctrine was a 
tool for interpreting whether the statutory provision at issue was 
ambiguous.11 More recently, the Court used the doctrine at Chevron’s 
second step to assess whether an agency’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous provision was reasonable.12 As Coenen and Davis note, the 
major questions doctrine, once a tool within the Chevron framework, 
expanded its dominion in King v. Burwell.13 
Other than one precursor,14 King v. Burwell was the first 
decision to apply the major questions doctrine to the initial question of 
whether Chevron’s two-step framework should apply at all—an inquiry 
referred to as “step zero.”15 This step asks whether Congress delegated 
the authority to interpret a potentially ambiguous statute with the force 
of law and, if so, whether the agency used its force-of-law authority.16 
Specifically, the Court held that Congress would not have implicitly 
delegated to the IRS the question of whether those who purchased 
health insurance on federally run exchanges could receive tax credits. 
The Court stated that whether “the tax credits . . . , involving billions of 
dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance 
for millions of people[,] . . . are available is . . . a question of deep 
‘economic and political significance.’ ”17 Because of this significance and 
the IRS’s lack of “expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this 
sort,” the Court concluded that Congress would only have delegated 
authority to decide the question to the IRS expressly.18 The Court then 
proceeded to answer the question created by ambiguous statutory 
provisions de novo and ultimately agreed with the IRS.19  
The notion that the major questions doctrine applied at step zero 
in King v. Burwell developed in the parties’ briefing and crystalized late 
during oral argument.  
 
 11. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 7, at 787–89 (discussing FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 437 (2001), and 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).  
 12. See id. at 790 (discussing Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014)). 
 13. See id. at 791–96. 
 14. In Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266–67 (2006), the Court invoked the major 
questions doctrine when deciding that Congress had not delegated interpretive authority to the 
Attorney General and thus was a step zero case. But, as Coenen and Davis note, the Court refused 
to defer to the executive interpretation for many reasons. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 7, at 
794 n.80. As we have written elsewhere, Gonzales also concerned the executive’s fundamental 
change to a longstanding regulatory scheme. King v. Burwell considered a new interpretation for 
a newly identified problem. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 10. 
 15. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 10. 
 16. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 17. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. at 2489–96. 
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The petitioners’ opening brief suggested the argument but did 
not squarely present it as a step zero issue. Using some language that 
sounded in step zero terms, the petitioners argued that Congress would 
not have “intended to delegate” the question of the availability of tax 
credits to the IRS because of its economic and political significance.20 
But they relied on decisions that applied the major questions doctrine 
at Chevron steps one and two, not the earlier decision that applied the 
doctrine at step zero.21 Moreover, their argument ended in terms that 
suggested Chevron step one by asserting that no ambiguity existed for 
agency discretion because the statute “ ‘directly spok[e] to the precise 
question’ at issue.”22  
In its responding brief, the federal government quickly 
dispatched the notion that Chevron did not apply to major questions by 
citing the Court’s recent opinion in City of Arlington v. FCC.23 In holding 
that Chevron’s framework applies to agencies’ statutory interpretations 
concerning their own regulatory jurisdiction, the City of Arlington 
Court stated that Chevron applies to “big, important” matters and 
“humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff.”24 Moreover, the government noted 
that the petitioners cited decisions that applied the major questions 
doctrine to Chevron step one, not step zero.25  
The petitioners’ reply brief, although continuing to cite a step 
two major questions decision,26 spoke more concretely in step zero 
terms, saying that the Court should “not defer on the fiction that 
Congress left it to the IRS.”27 Moreover, it briefly referred to two 
considerations that concern whether Congress has delegated 
interpretive primacy to agencies: the IRS’s lack of expertise over the 
matter at issue and the IRS’s lack of sole authority to administer 
portions of the statute.28 That said, the petitioners’ argument became 
incoherent in one respect. They asserted that the “Court should . . . 
discern, based on its best reading of the ACA, what Congress meant 
 
 20. Brief for Petitioners at 52, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14–114) 
(capitalized letters omitted). 
 21. See id. (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000), and Utility 
Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). The brief did not refer to Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 22. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 842 (1984)). 
 23. Brief for Respondents at 57, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14–114) (citing 
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)). 
 24. See id. (quoting City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 22, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14–114) 
(citing Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 23. 
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when it ‘directly spoke to this precise question.’ ”29 Yet, if Congress 
spoke directly to the question, no delegation could occur because neither 
the agency nor the Court would have interpretive space. To the extent 
that the Court is merely announcing Congress’s clear command, the 
Court would be interpreting the statute at Chevron’s first step. Once 
again, the petitioners appeared to trip on their Chevron steps. 
But the Court, at least on this one issue, caught the petitioners 
as they stumbled. Chevron came up only at the end of oral argument. 
Justice Kennedy more clearly framed a step zero question that assumed 
statutory ambiguity, something the petitioners’ brief never clearly did. 
After noting that we “think about Chevron” if a statute is ambiguous, 
he observed that it would be “a drastic step for us to say that the [IRS] 
can make [the tax-credit determination] when there are . . . billions of 
dollars of subsidies involved.”30 After the Solicitor General largely 
repeated the government’s briefing points,31 the Chief Justice asked 
whether “a subsequent administration could change [the IRS’s current] 
interpretation.”32 The Solicitor General responded that it would be 
possible but difficult to do under Chevron step two’s reasonableness 
inquiry.33 Notably, Justice Kennedy and the Chief Justice were two of 
the three dissenting Justices in City of Arlington, in which they argued 
that courts must carefully consider whether Congress has delegated 
particular questions to an agency.34 
Thus, the major questions doctrine’s new application to step 
zero—focusing both on the significance of the question and on agency 
expertise—slowly crystalized during the litigation process. Based on 
the new doctrine’s proponents at oral argument, it appears to be a 
means of focusing judicial attention on the specific statutory matter at 
hand to determine whether congressional delegation occurred. Even 
then, the Court’s decision was problematic. As Coenen and Davis 
discuss, the Court failed to provide guidance on what constituted a 
“major question,” the force of this one consideration as compared to 
others, and the interplay of the existence of a major question and agency 
expertise.35  
 
 29. Id. at 22 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 842 (1984) 
(alterations omitted)). 
 30. Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14–114). 
 31. See id. at 75–76. 
 32. Id. at 76. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“But 
before a court may grant such deference, it must on its own decide whether Congress—the branch 
vested with lawmaking authority under the Constitution—has in fact delegated to the agency 
lawmaking power over the ambiguity at issue.”). 
 35. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 7, at 793–96. 
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B. Assessing the Scholarly Reactions to King v. Burwell 
Scholars have not treated the Court’s application of the major 
questions doctrine to step zero in King v. Burwell kindly, although they 
have attempted to understand its place in the Court’s Chevron 
jurisprudence.  
Numerous scholars have noted the vagueness surrounding 
which questions have “deep economic and political significance.”36 
Some, including one of us, have questioned whether the new doctrine 
was intended to apply only to tax matters.37 Others have wondered 
whether it was intended to kill Chevron altogether38 or serve as a 
“power canon” for the Court to “seiz[e] power aligned with its basic 
distrust of an active administrative state.”39 One of us has also noted 
that the new major questions doctrine appears to be part of the Chief 
Justice’s ongoing efforts to limit Chevron’s reach.40 And another scholar 
has suggested that the doctrine should be understood as refocusing the 
step zero inquiry on the actual likelihood of congressional delegation.41  
Or it may turn out that this new major questions doctrine means 
none of those things. It may simply be that the Justices in the 
majority—having agreed on the underlying interpretation—thought 
that the matter was too insignificant to develop and perhaps expected 
it to fade into doctrinal obscurity.42  
In the face of the uncertainty surrounding the new major 
questions doctrine, Coenen and Davis call for the lower courts to review 
agency statutory interpretations without regard to the doctrine at step 
zero, leaving it exclusively for invocation by the Supreme Court. 
Because of the significance of the interpretations to which the doctrine 
would apply, Coenen and Davis argue that the doctrine will be 
 
 36. See, e.g., David Gammage, Foreword—King v. Burwell Symposium: Comments on the 
Commentaries (and on Some Elephants in the Room), 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5; Kristin E. Hickman, 
The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 57. 
 37. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer & Chris J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer?, 2015 
PEPP. L. REV. 33, 35, 42. 
 38. See Steve Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax: From the Early Days to King 
and Beyond, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 19; see also Catherine Sharkey, In the Wake of Chevron’s Retreat 
(unpublished manuscript), http://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2016/ 
06/Sharkey_In-the-Wake-of-Chevron_5_20_16.pdf (“King v. Burwell and Michigan v. EPA—
decided within the same momentous week in June 2015—taken together, seem to augur the 
Supreme Court’s retreat from the venerable Chevron.”). 
 39. Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV., at *1 (forthcoming 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757770. 
 40. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1097–98; Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. [Part II.B.3] (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826146; accord 
Hickman, supra note 36, at 58. 
 41. Jonathan Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983, 984–85 (2017). 
 42. See Hickman, supra note 36, at 66. 
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ineffective in the lower courts because the Supreme Court will likely 
need to provide its own de novo review regardless. And few, if any, 
interpretations that qualify for the doctrine would not also qualify for 
certiorari review.43 Leaving de novo review to the Supreme Court, they 
argue, would further the new major questions doctrine’s ability to settle 
legal questions, whereas review in numerous lower courts would not.44 
The lower courts, they further contend, will encounter significant 
decision costs in even considering a prolonged step zero analysis and 
will likely erroneously apply the standard in too many cases.45  
Although Coenen and Davis concede that their approach will 
limit the ability of lower courts to develop the contours of the new major 
questions doctrine and thus aid Supreme Court review, they question 
the need for further “percolation.”46 The lower courts’ review under 
Chevron, they argue, could be useful to the Supreme Court’s de novo 
review of the statutory question. Moreover, lower courts can use dicta 
or separate opinions to signal their views on matters reserved for 
Supreme Court review.47 In short, the new major questions doctrine, 
under Coenen and Davis’s proposal, would not only apply to exceptional 
questions but also constitute itself an exceptional doctrine that 
contravenes the traditional vertical nature of precedent in the 
American jurisprudential system. 
II. VALUABLE COURTS, NECESSARY QUESTIONS 
Despite our appreciation for the creativity of Coenen and Davis’s 
proposal and our agreement on many of the new major questions 
doctrine’s failings, we disagree with their proposal for two principal 
reasons.  
First, the new major questions doctrine is an inquiry anchored 
to Chevron’s theoretical grounding (Part II.A). As empirical evidence 
and recent congressional practice suggest, the doctrine is germane to 
whether Congress delegated interpretive primacy to agencies. Applying 
Chevron when no delegation has occurred separates doctrine from 
theory.  
Second, one should not so easily dismiss the benefits of further 
percolation in the lower courts (Part II.B). The circuit courts serve as 
jurisprudential laboratories for developing (or even jettisoning) legal 
rules and standards. Our empirical study of Chevron in the circuit 
 
 43. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 7, at 800–01. 
 44. See id. at 811. 
 45. See id. at 812–20. 
 46. See id. at 821. 
 47. See id. at 821–23. 
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courts supports this percolation point, while also suggesting that circuit 
courts will not grossly misuse the new major questions doctrine as an 
excuse to abandon Chevron’s strictures opportunistically.  
A. Severing Chevron from its Theoretical Moorings 
The Supreme Court has consistently grounded Chevron 
deference on a delegation theory.48 Under this theory, the Court 
respects Congress’s delegation to agencies to resolve ambiguities or fill 
gaps in statutes that agencies administer. This delegation gives 
agencies, as opposed to courts, interpretive primacy over the 
ambiguities or gaps in statutes the agencies administer.49 Although the 
Court has never justified the normative basis for the delegation theory, 
it has suggested that it resides in notions of agency expertise, 
deliberative process, and political accountability.50 Congress can 
delegate explicitly or implicitly.51 The Court understands Congress to 
do the latter usually by giving the agency the authority to act with the 
force of law by enacting notice-and-comment rules or conducting formal 
on-the-record adjudication.52 Chevron’s step zero is the stage at which 
courts assess whether congressional delegation has occurred. 
The key criticism of the delegation theory is that it is fictional or 
fraudulent. It is fictional, some argue, because statutory ambiguity is 
not a sufficient signal of congressional delegation; Congress’s 
preference for formalized agency action does not speak to the delegation 
of interpretive primacy.53 It is fraudulent, others argue, because courts 
do not actually care about Congress’s intent; they rely, instead, on 
questionable presumptions without further inquiry.54 These criticisms 
appeared to gain force after the Court’s decision in City of Arlington v. 
FCC.55 In holding that Chevron’s framework applied to an agency’s 
determination of its regulatory jurisdiction, the Court rejected the 
dissent’s position that “a general conferral of rulemaking authority does 
not validate rules for all the matters the agency is charged with 
administering.”56 Moreover, it refused to distinguish between “big, 
important” matters, such as “jurisdictional ones,” and “humdrum, run-
 
 48. See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 14–15 (2015). 
 49. See id. at 14.  
 50. See id. at 14, 15. 
 51. See id. at 14. 
 52. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). 
 53. See Barnett, supra note 48, at 21. 
 54. See id. 
 55. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013). 
 56. See id. at 1874. 
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of-the-mill” matters.57 In short, City of Arlington sought to create a step 
zero inquiry that eschewed nuance for clarity. 
The new major questions doctrine, as a step zero inquiry, makes 
more sense once one considers it as a response to these critiques. By 
evaluating the specific question at issue, the question’s relationship to 
the regulatory regime, and the agency’s expertise in resolving that 
matter, the doctrine seeks to divine whether Congress actually 
delegated interpretive primacy to the agency on a specific question. 
Whatever its faults and whatever its convergence with the Court’s 
certiorari process, the new major questions doctrine takes Chevron’s 
underlying delegation theory seriously. It provides an inquiry that 
moves beyond the “fictional” import of statutory ambiguity and 
formalized action. And in moving beyond broad, nearly irrebuttable 
presumptions and asking pointed questions to investigate Congress’s 
likely intent, the delegation theory loosens its “fraudulent” mantle. 
Allowing lower courts to ignore or limit this inquiry leaves Chevron 
unmoored from its proper role in judicial review.  
That the Court takes the delegation theory seriously does not 
mean that it correctly identifies congressional preferences. For 
instance, although some argue that the formality of agency action is 
distinct from interpretive primacy,58 it may be that formality, by 
providing sufficient salience for congressional oversight, informs 
congressional delegation of interpretive primacy.59 Similar debates 
could arise over the new major questions doctrine. Congress may well 
want to leave major questions with an agency because of the agency’s 
political accountability to the President and Congress. But it may also 
be that Congress would prefer that the Court resolve major questions 
because they are outside the agency’s ken or because Congress does not 
want future administrations to be able to change the answer.60  
Although our purpose in these limited pages is not to prove the 
doctrine’s soundness as a device to glean congressional intent, 
significant survey responses and congressional actions suggest that, 
contrary to Coenen and Davis’s intuition,61 the Supreme Court’s new 
major questions doctrine has some foundation. First, survey responses 
from congressional drafters indicate that they do not believe that 
Congress intends to delegate major questions to agencies. In Abbe 
 
 57. See id. at 1868. 
 58. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. 
REV. 201, 218–219. 
 59. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 
VA. L. REV. 2009, 2044 (2011). 
 60. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 937 (2005). 
 61. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 7, at 802–05.  
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Gluck and Lisa Bressman’s path-breaking study of congressional 
drafters, only 28% of those drafters surveyed thought Congress 
implicitly delegates major policy questions to agencies.62 Further, only 
38% thought Congress implicitly delegates economically significant 
questions, while only 33% thought Congress implicitly delegates 
politically significant questions.63 Similarly, agency rule drafters 
surveyed in a related study were also skeptical that Congress delegates 
major questions to agencies, albeit to a lesser extent. 56% of those 
agency drafters responded that Congress implicitly delegates major 
policy questions to agencies.64 But when the survey questions more 
specifically targeted economically significant and politically significant 
questions, only 49% and 32% of those drafters responded that Congress 
intends to delegate those matters to agencies through ambiguity or gaps 
in a statute.65 These survey results, despite their methodological 
limitations,66 provide some evidence that the Court’s new major 
questions doctrine is an accurate (or at least colorable) understanding 
of congressional delegation preferences and thus a valid inquiry under 
Chevron step zero.67 
Second, Coenen and Davis largely discard the expertise 
rationale from King v. Burwell,68 but agency expertise may be one of the 
most legitimate indicia of congressional intent to delegate. Congress 
has only expressly evidenced its preferences as to interpretive primacy 
in one statute, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act.69 In that statute, Congress expressly gave courts 
interpretive primacy over certain formalized agency state-law 
preemption determinations by requiring courts on judicial review to use 
factors propounded in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.70 Legislative history 
indicated that Congress did so because it was concerned that the 
 
 62. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 901, 1003 (2013). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1055 
(2015). 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 1013–16. 
 67. See also Walker, supra note 6, at 1005–114 (exploring in greater detail the implications 
of the findings from these two empirical studies for the Chief Justice’s approach to Chevron 
deference). 
 68. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 7, at 795 n.87 (arguing that the expertise rationale was 
a “makeweight” and not persuasive in the context of delegations to the IRS). 
 69. 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2012). 
 70. Id. § 25b(b)(5)(A); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Skidmore calls 
for judicial review in which an agency’s views are not controlling on courts, as under Chevron, but 
nonetheless may have the power to persuade. See id. at 140. In other words, courts retain 
interpretive primacy under Skidmore review. 
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agency, subject to regulatory capture, had not used its expertise for 
more than a decade when preempting state law.71 Congress, however, 
included a savings clause to permit Chevron review of other agency 
decisions.72 In other words, the only time that Congress has directly 
spoken to a matter of interpretive primacy, it focused on the agency’s 
possession and use of expertise as the key factor. Indeed, it is no 
surprise that 93% of congressional respondents in the Gluck and 
Bressman study indicated that Congress intends to fill ambiguities 
relating to the agency’s area of expertise, second only to ambiguities 
relating to the details of implementation (99%).73 
Coenen and Davis argue that, even if Congress intended to give 
interpretive primacy to courts, it does not follow that Congress wanted 
to give primacy to all courts, as opposed to only the Supreme Court.74 If 
that were so, Coenen and Davis would face an almost vertical climb. 
Mere silence would go much further than suggesting legislative 
delegation of discretion to the executive branch in the course of 
executing law, as in the case with Chevron. It would suggest, instead, 
upsetting traditional, uniform default notions of precedent’s vertical 
application. That implicit suggestion seems even less likely because 
Congress has used express provisions to alter judicial review. As 
Coenen and Davis note, Congress knows how to rely on only Supreme 
Court interpretations when it wants to.75 In the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress expressly permitted 
habeas petitioners to rely upon only “clearly established law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court” to question state-court judgments.76 
By doing so, the provision altered the default rule that permitted 
federal courts, uniformly, to rule on the matters de novo.77  
All of this is not to say that the new major questions doctrine is 
free from definitional problems as to what exactly constitutes a major 
 
 71. See Barnett, supra note 48, at 39–40. 
 72. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(B). 
 73. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 62, at 1004–05 & fig.11. The results are similar for agency 
rule drafters: 92% of agency rule drafters surveyed indicated that Congress intends to fill 
ambiguities relating to the agency’s area of expertise, second only to ambiguities relating to the 
details of implementation (99%). Walker, supra note 6, at 1053 fig.10. Moreover, 79% of rule 
drafters indicated that the agency’s expertise is a relevant factor that affects whether Chevron 
deference applies to a statutory ambiguity—second only to the two Mead factors of congressional 
authorization of agency rulemaking or formal adjudication (84%) and the agency’s use of such 
lawmaking authority (80%). See id. at 1063–65 & tbl. 1. 
 74. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 7, at 805. 
 75. See id. at 824. 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 77. See Adam Steinman, Reconceptulizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How 
Should AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 
1496. 
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question. But this same indeterminacy has also bedeviled other legal 
standards, including the step zero inquiry into whether an agency has 
acted with the “force of law.”78 Lower courts have confronted 
indeterminacy and shaped the standard by using an incremental case-
by-case approach.79 Indeed, it is precisely these determinacy issues that 
further percolation in the lower courts can help address.  
B. Reevaluating the Benefits and Costs of Percolation 
As numerous scholars, including Coenen and Davis, recognize,80 
lower-court percolation can be valuable.81 Percolation permits courts to 
consider and refine legal rules in response to new factual scenarios and 
decisions from other courts.82 By witnessing the consequences of a legal 
principle’s application in various scenarios, all courts obtain more 
information to assess the principle’s propriety and scope.83 This 
decentralized decision-making process also encourages dialogue 
between the courts and the political branches.84 Despite the “madness” 
of allowing numerous courts to reach inconsistent and opposing views 
and the inefficiency that it entails, lower-court percolation “has a 
method. If the circuits all agree, their precedents resolve the question; 
 
 78. Barnett, supra note 48, at 56–57. 
 79. See id.; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005) (describing disparate application of Mead’s command 
in the circuit courts). 
 80. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 7, at 821 (citing Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court 
Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 
481–501 (2012)). As Gewirtzman argues: 
[a]mong other things, a robust percolation process allows the Court to use its limited 
monitoring resources more efficiently, minimizes the Court’s expenditures of political 
capital, incentivizes lower court judges to take their job more seriously, and lets the 
Court measure support for a potential ruling among lower court judges, who are 
ultimately charged with applying the rule and whose allegiance is necessary for the 
Court to enforce its will. 
Gewirtzman, supra, at 484. 
 81. The lack of empirical data renders it difficult to know to what extent lower court opinions 
influence other lower courts or the Supreme Court. See Gewirtzman, supra note 80, at 494; see also 
Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 423, 437–40 (2013) (noting judicial and academic skepticism over percolation’s benefits). 
 82. See Gewirtzman, supra note 80, at 485–86. 
 83. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
65–66 (1998). 
 84. See Gewirtzman, supra note 80, at 488; see also Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary 
Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1600–
1620 (2014) (identifying various tools that courts use to engage in a richer dialogue with the 
political branches). 
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if they disagree, the Supreme Court gains from the clash of opposing 
views.”85  
This percolation is most useful for a legal standard (like the new 
major questions doctrine that speaks in broader, less-defined terms 
than a legal rule) and requires case-by-case application to give it 
meaning. Moreover, the inter-branch dialogue that percolation 
encourages is especially useful for a standard such as the new major 
questions doctrine, or the force-of-law inquiry, that seeks to ascertain 
legislative intent. 
Coenen and Davis, without fully rejecting percolation’s benefits, 
respond that lower courts can use dicta or separate opinions to provide 
insights to the Supreme Court when it addresses the doctrine. Although 
both of these options do provide some percolation, they are not as 
beneficial as lower courts deciding the issue. Because the discussion 
would be unnecessary to the holding and perhaps only a matter 
addressed in one judge’s concurring opinion, the percolation may be 
limited. Judges may not spend meaningful time thinking about a 
matter that will not affect the outcome or provide sufficient intra-panel 
ventilation on an issue that appears in a colleague’s solo opinion. Some 
judges, too, may have philosophical objections with potentially 
exceeding their Article III role by discussing matters not necessary for 
deciding the case.86 
Coenen and Davis’s fear that the lower courts will purposefully 
or inadvertently use the new major questions doctrine to escape 
Chevron’s strictures for nonmajor questions does not strike us as a 
significant concern. We recently completed a study on Chevron 
deference in the circuit courts that attempted, with broad search terms, 
to consider every published circuit-court decision over an eleven-year 
period that cited Chevron (even if it did not ultimately apply it).87 We 
coded the relevant decisions for nearly forty variables related to the 
 
 85. Samuel Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. 
REV., at *5 (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2864175 (citing Harold Leventhal, A 
Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 881, 907 (1975) (noting 
the “value in percolation among the circuits, with room for a healthful difference that may balance 
the final result”)). To be sure, without percolation, the Supreme Court could address major 
statutory issues more quickly, and this alacrity may be especially valuable when significant 
business interests need guidance on how to proceed. See Dorf, supra note 83, at 66. But we put 
those objections aside in this case because even Coenen and Davis’s proposal to permit the lower 
courts to engage in standard Chevron review would not, by itself, lead to immediate Supreme Court 
resolution of a decision. 
 86. See, e.g., Ryan S. Killan, Dicta and the Rule of Law, 2013 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 9 (“It is now 
widely accepted that the rule [that dicta is not binding] is of constitutional dimension—by limiting 
the judiciary’s power to actual cases and controversies, Article III divests judges any power to issue 
advisory opinions. Dicta is, at bottom, a form of advisory opinion for future cases.”). 
 87. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 10, at 5. 
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agency statutory interpretation and the court’s review (such as the 
subject matter, the format of an agency’s interpretation, the standard 
of review, and factors that the courts invoked in their review).88 Our 
study, which culled cases that were all decided before King v. Burwell, 
did not specifically consider the circuit courts’ use of the major 
questions doctrine at any of the Chevron steps. But it did consider two 
sensitive matters and the doctrinal and theoretical factors that circuit 
courts invoke. Our findings suggest that the circuit courts would not 
meaningfully abandon Chevron review even if King v. Burwell gave 
them a colorable ground for doing so. 
For the two types of sensitive agency interpretations for which 
we coded—an agency’s interpretation of its own regulatory 
jurisdiction89 and an agency’s interpretation that preempted state 
law90—the circuit courts applied Chevron at normal rates. For matters 
concerning regulatory jurisdiction, courts applied Chevron to 
interpretations concerning regulatory jurisdiction almost exactly as 
often (74.3%) as they applied Chevron to all agency statutory 
interpretations (74.8%).91 The same was true for matters concerning 
state-law preemption (76.0%).92 The circuit courts’ loyalty to Chevron is 
even more striking when one considers that an earlier study found that 
the Supreme Court applied Chevron’s framework to regulatory-
jurisdiction questions only about 35% of the time.93 For neither 
sensitive matter did the circuit courts expand their de novo review, 
despite having some room to do so.  
Second, the circuit courts have not referred significantly to 
certain factors that could give them more discretion to review agency 
statutory interpretations de novo. Coenen and Davis note that the 
circuit courts have coalesced around an analytical regime at Chevron’s 
 
 88. See id. at 6. 
 89. See id. at 70–73. Until the Court held in City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013), 
that Chevron applied to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulatory jurisdiction, the lower 
courts were split. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing circuit 
split), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 90. On preemption matters, the Supreme Court has applied both Chevron and Skidmore 
deference, and scholars, including one of us, have called for Skidmore to apply. See Barnett & 
Walker, supra note 10, at 16, 72; see also Kent H. Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption 
Expertise with Chevmore Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014). The call for Skidmore’s 
application to preemption matters is consistent with findings from surveys of congressional 
statutory drafters and agency rule drafters in which a majority reported that Congress does not 
implicitly delegate to agencies authority to preempt state law. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 
10, at 16. 
 91. See Barnett & Walker, supra note 10, at 71. 
 92. See id. at 72. 
 93. See id. at 70 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1131 (2008)). 
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step zero after Mead that focuses on the formality of agency action.94 
Although the Mead inquiry continues to present problems,95 it does 
indicate that lower-court percolation of step zero standards can work 
reasonably well. But what renders it more remarkable is that the lower 
courts’ coalescence around formality was not preordained. The Supreme 
Court in Barnhart v. Walton indicated in dicta, only one year after 
Mead, that formality or its absence could not alone resolve whether the 
Chevron framework would apply.96 Instead, the suitability of Chevron 
depended upon numerous factors, including congressional 
acquiescence,97 “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related 
expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to 
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, 
and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a 
long period of time.”98 The lower courts could have invoked these factors 
to manipulate Chevron’s application. 
But our findings indicate that they did not do so. We coded 
whether the circuit courts invoked certain doctrinal or theoretical 
factors that a similar study of the Supreme Court had considered. Of 
those coded factors, three (expertise, longevity, and congressional 
acquiescence) tracked Barnhart’s considerations. The circuit courts 
(whether or not applying the Chevron framework) invoked expertise 
and longevity in all cases “more frequently than other contextual 
factors, but still at relatively low rates of 18.43% and 10.76% and more 
frequently in the context of Skidmore review in which they are doctrinal 
factors.”99 The circuit courts referred to congressional acquiescence in 
only 3.1% of the cases, indicating that the factor has little purchase on 
the circuit courts.100 Of course, circuit courts may manipulate judicial 
review by omitting references to certain review standards or 
considering other factors (expressly or silently). But it strikes us as 
telling that they have refrained from invoking factors that could provide 
them cover in doing so. We do not see why circuit courts would act in a 
contrary manner with the new major questions doctrine at their 
disposal. 
 
 94. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 7, at 813 n.146. 
 95. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 96. 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). 
 97. See id. at 219–20. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Barnett & Walker, supra note 10, at 82. 
 100. See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the two years since the Supreme Court introduced the new 
major questions doctrine in King v. Burwell, we have not made much 
progress in understanding its scope as a limitation on Chevron’s 
domain. The doctrine strikes us as having great potential to ground 
Chevron deference in a proper theory of congressional delegation. But 
much more theoretical and doctrinal work needs to be done. Unlike 
Coenen and Davis, we believe that lower courts can and should play a 
vital role in helping to shape this new doctrine. Having just reviewed 
every published circuit-court decision that implicates Chevron 
deference from 2003 through 2013, we are confident the circuit courts 
have much value to add, and we are not as worried as Coenen and Davis 
that the circuit courts will strategically use the new major questions 
doctrine to overturn agency statutory interpretations. 
But if Coenen and Davis’s fears of lower court mischief turn out 
to be well founded, we do not similarly worry that the Supreme Court 
would fail to intervene to correct course. After all, a mischievous use of 
the new major questions doctrine would result in a lower court 
erroneously invalidating an agency interpretation of a statute the 
agency administers. Such an invalidation generally constitutes a 
decision on “an important question of federal law that has not been, but 
should be, settled by [the Supreme] Court,” thus meriting certiorari 
review even in the absence of a circuit split.101  
If the Supreme Court’s current certiorari process does not 
provide a sufficient check on such lower-court mischief, we should 
encourage the Court to take more cases that implicate the new major 
questions doctrine, either as part of its merits docket via certiorari 
review or as part of its “shadow docket” via summary reversal.102 
Especially for a doctrine in its infancy, however, short-circuiting the 
development of the new major questions doctrine in the lower courts 
would be a serious error. It is critical that the Supreme Court leverage 
lower courts’ expertise to further shape the contours of this important 
limit on agency lawmaking authority. 
 
 
 101. SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (including as reason for granting certiorari review); see also David C. 
Frederick, Christopher J. Walker & David M. Burke, The Insider’s Guide to the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in APPELLATE PRACTICE COMPENDIUM 7 (Dana Livingston ed., 2012) (noting 
that where there is a lack of a circuit split the Court will “focus on the national importance of the 
question(s) presented and the likelihood that the court below reached the wrong conclusion”). 
 102. See William Baude, The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 1, 43–45 
(2015) (noting the trend of summary reversals in state-on-top qualified immunity and state habeas 
cases, among others). 
